Reflecting concerns about the aftermath of several fires in southwest Oregon in 2002, Commissioner Doug Robertson, on behalf of the Douglas County Board of Commissioners, requested that the Oregon State University (OSU) College of Forestry examine post-fire restoration considerations that would be influenced most strongly by action or inaction in the near term. The College was specifically requested to review the consequences of action or inaction on the following items as a function of 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year delays in action:

• Forest regeneration
  - likelihood of near- and long-term vegetative recovery to stand and landscape conditions with a desirable species composition and structure
  - habitat conditions in the near and long term for threatened and endangered species of native plants and animals
  -  near- and long-term resilience and resistance of forest and rangelands to future disturbances, such as fire and storms
• Water quality as it relates to Clean Water Act standards and habitat for aquatic species
• Soil erosion effects on site fertility and on sediments deposited in streams
• Vulnerabilities to invasive species of plants and animals
• Potential impacts of effects of the fire on the ability of the federal agencies to achieve the objectives of the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) (FEMAT 1993, Tuchmann et al. 1996)
• Road system management

Economic Issues

• Risks related to future fires, insects, disease, or invasive species posed to adjoining property and residences by near- and long-term forest and rangeland conditions
• Timber salvage
  - revenues to counties produced or foregone
  - total value of marketable resources produced or foregone
• Local and regional capacity for future wildland and fire management
• Social quality of life, recreation programs, and aesthetics as impacted by treatment, delayed treatment, and no treatment. The impact of brush fields developing because of lack of treatment is a major concern.

Because time and resources were limited, this report addresses three of these considerations: forest regeneration, fire and insect risk reduction, and timber salvage.

The Biscuit Fire was selected as the study area primarily because written and electronic information was readily available. The Biscuit Fire began July 13, 2002. During the next 54 days, Biscuit burned approximately 400,000 acres within a perimeter surrounding 500,000 acres on the Siskiyou National Forest. Biscuit was the largest fire in recorded Oregon history and the nation’s most expensive fire suppression effort of 2002, reportedly costing $150 million in federal and state funds.

Our analysis led us to ask (1) what kind of forest and other vegetation existed before the Biscuit Fire, (2) what exists now, in the immediate aftermath of the fires, and (3) what are the likely consequences and tradeoffs of allowing natural recovery, as contrasted to management interventions that hasten return of forest vegetation, capture some economic values, and reduce risks that future wildfires and insect outbreaks will impede recovery of ecosystems.

This report independently examines the same database available to the Rogue River/Siskiyou National Forests. Although there is much agreement with the data used by the Forests, this independent examination permits a perspective unconstrained by current administrative plans and policies.

Highlights of our findings include the following:

• Site conditions conducive to prompt reforestation of conifers will diminish rapidly asaggressive native shrubs and hardwoods resprout or regenerate along with invasive weedspecies.
• Reforestation, vegetation control, and removal of remaining dead and dying trees provide the main opportunities to reduce risk of recurring large-scale fires and shrubencroachment.
• Riparian habitat and habitat suitable for old-growth-dependent wildlife can benefit immensely from immediate actions to aid ecosystem recovery to forested conditions.
• The economic value of fire-killed timber will decline rapidly.
• Fire risk will increase if fuels are not managed and insects further damage fire-injured timber.
• When management to restore ecosystem health takes soils, water, fish and wildlife into account, adverse impacts can be minor compared with the long-term consequences ofdelayed action or lack of management interventions.
• The Biscuit fire presents area managers and the American people with a “once in ageneration” opportunity to use such a large event to document the consequences and tradeoffs associated with letting nature take its course versus taking a variety of actions to influence future ecosystem conditions. This can be done by using large portions or all of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area as a “control” and non-wilderness areas as the "treatments."
• Biscuit provides an unparalleled opportunity to evaluate the efficacy of the federal NWFP as an ecological strategy to provide for late-successional forest resource values and uses in fire-prone ecosystems,

• We estimate that 10 billion board feet of conifer and hardwood was growing within the Biscuit Fire area on all land classes before the burn. Trees containing an estimated 4.2 billion board feet (conifer 83%, hardwood 17%) were killed by the fire, and an additional 0.8 billion board feet in fire-stressed trees are at risk of insect attack. Aggressive forest regeneration could accelerate the return to large-conifer-dominated forest ecosystems by 50 years or more and hasten return of forests to old-growth characteristics and values.
• Because grass, herbs, shrubs, and hardwoods will rapidly reoccupy much of the burned area, timely and aggressive reforestation is the only effective way to restore desired conifer forests on the most severely burned areas. Immediate action improves the odds of seedling survival and growth. The absence of such a reforestation program, in light of climate-change trends, will consign much of the burned area to shrub and hardwood cover for decades, perhaps centuries.
• The absence of an aggressive forest regeneration program will adversely affect late successional forest species. Particularly affected will be the federally listed northern spotted owl and other species inhabiting the mature conifer forests that received increased protection under the NWFP, especially in the intermittent and perennial stream zones.
• When planting is delayed beyond 2 years, the use of herbicides (approved by the Environmental Protection Agency) to control invasive species, native weeds, and highly competitive shrub species could reduce the cost of conifer establishment by up to twothirds and improve the growth of young conifer stands. Herbicides could be a major factor in avoiding failure. 
• Direct seeding, not feasible now because of restricted use of rodenticides and bird repellents, could greatly accelerate reforestation efforts in some remote areas where uniform stocking is not a goal.
• As much as 2 billion board feet of fire-killed timber, plus up to 0.5 billion additional board feet of insect-threatened fire-stressed timber, outside of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness may be economically accessible, depending on an array of policy decisions and funding. In 2002, 3.8 billion board feet were harvested from all forestlands in the state.
• The impact of carefully administered salvage logging on soil erosion is small and temporary when low impact ground skidders, cable systems, and helicopters are used. It is also small relative to the natural geological processes that characterize the region.
• The loss in value of dead trees from decay and insects is about 22% after the first year. At the end of 5 years, only the butt logs of the largest trees will have salvage value. The decline in economic value is even more rapid than the decay rate. By the summer of 2003, the loss of economic value is estimated to be in the tens of millions of dollars.  
• Employment opportunities from salvaged trees average about 8–10 jobs per million board feet. Mill capacity in southwest Oregon and adjacent areas is probably sufficient to handle the potentially salvageable volume from Biscuit if market conditions are favorable. The net gain in regional employment would depend on how much fire-killed timber is substituted for green timber from private lands.
• The NWFP and associated laws, regulations, and current agency policies do not adequately address the natural dynamics of fire-prone ecosystems or the consequences of large, intense disturbances on desired future conditions of the forests.
• Recent salvage/restoration efforts in Missouri, Texas, and Arizona, as well as on the 1987 Silver Fire within the Biscuit Fire perimeter, provide important lessons. Aggressive action protected human health and safety in Missouri, protected endangered species and reduced insect risk in Texas, and salvaged economic values for Native Americans in Arizona. In Oregon, delayed timber salvage following the 1987 Silver Fire recovered some economic value, but Forest budgets at the time permitted only limited conifer restoration.